Abstract. We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of the values of low variables. We then show how to measure the security of a program with respect to this notion via a computable estimate of the timing leakage and use this estimate for cost optimisation.
Introduction
Early work on language-based security, such as Volpano and Smith's type systems [1] , precluded the use of high security variables to affect control flow. Specifically, the conditions in if-commands and while-commands were restricted to using only low security information. If this restriction is weakened, it opens up the possibility that high security data may be leaked through the different timing behaviour of alternative control paths. This kind of leakage of information is said to form a covert timing channel and is a serious threat to the security of programs (cf. e.g. [2] ).
We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a (probabilistic) program and the probability of the values of low variables. This notion is a non-trivial extension of similar ideas for deterministic programs [3] which also covers attacks based on the combined observation of time and low variables. This earlier work presents an approach which, having identified a covert timing channel, provides a program transformation which neutralises the channel.
We start by introducing a semantic model of timed probabilistic transition systems. Our approach is based on modelling programs essentially as Markov Chains (MC) where the stochastic behaviour is determined by a joint distribution on both the values assigned to the program's variables and the time it takes the program to perform a given command. This is very different from other approaches in the area of automata theory which are also dealing with both time and probability. In this area the timed automata constitute a well-established model [4] . These automata have been extended with probability and used in model-checking for the verification of probabilistic timed temporal logic properties of real-time systems [5] . The resulting model is essentially a Markov Decision Process where rewards are interpreted as time durations and is therefore quite different from our MC approach. In particular, the presence of non-determinism makes it not very appropriate as a base of our quantitative analysis aiming at measuring timing leaks. We next present a concrete programming language with a timed probabilistic transition system as its execution model. This language is based on the language studied in [3] but is extended with a probabilistic choice construct -whilst this may not play a role in user programs, it has an essential role in our program transformation. In order to determine and quantify the security of systems and the effectiveness of potential counter-measures against timing attacks we then discuss an approximate notion of timed bisimilarity and construct an algorithm for computing a quantitative estimate of the vulnerability of a system against timing attacks; this is given in terms of the mismatch between the actual transition probabilities and those of an ideal perfectly confined program. Finally, we present a probabilistic variation of Agat's padding algorithm which we use to illustrate -via an example -a technique for formally analysing the trade-off between security costs and protection.
Timed Probabilistic Transition Systems
The execution model of programs which we will use in the following is that of a labelled transition system; more precisely, we will consider probabilistic transition systems (PTS). We will put labels on transitions as well as states; the former will have "times" associated with them while the latter will be labelled by uninterpreted entities which are intended to represent the values of (low security) variables, i.e. the computational state during the execution of a program. We will not specify what kind of "time labels" we use -e.g. whether we have a discrete or continuous time model -we just assume that time labels are taken from a finite set T ⊆ R + of positive real numbers. The "state labels" will be taken from an abstract set which we denote by L. We denote by s 1 p:t / / s 2 the fact that (s 1 , p, t, s 2 ) ∈−→ with s 1 , s 2 ∈ S, p ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ T.
In a general tPTS we can have non-determinism in the sense that for two states s 1 s 2 we may have s 1 1:t1 / / s 2 and s 1 1:t2 / / s 2 , which would suggest that it is possible to make a transition from s 1 to s 2 in different times (t 1 and t 2 ) and probability 1, i.e. certainly. In order to eliminate non-determinism we will consider in this paper only tPTS's which are subject to the following conditions:
The first condition means that we consider here a purely probabilistic or generative execution model. The second condition allows us to associate a unique probability to every transition time between two states, i.e. triple (s 1 , t, s 2 ); this means that we can define a function π : S × T × S → 
.).
Even for a tPTS with a finite number of states it is possible to have infinite execution sequences. It is thus, in general, necessary to consider measure theoretic notions in order to define a mathematically sound model for the possible behaviours of a tPTS. However, as long as we consider only terminating systems, i.e. finite traces, things are somewhat simpler. In particular, in this case, probability distributions can replace measures as they are equivalent. In this paper we restrict our attention to terminating traces and probability distributions. This allows us to define for every finite execution sequence σ = (s 0 , s 1 , . . .) its running time as τ (σ) = t i , and its execution probability as π(σ) = t i . We will also associate to every state s 0 its execution tree, i.e. the collection of all execution sequences starting in s 0 .
Observing tPTS's
In Section 3 we will present an operational semantics of a simple imperative programming language, pWhile, via a tPTS. Based on this model we will then investigate the vulnerability against attackers who are able to observe (i) the time, and (ii) the state labels, i.e. the low variables. In this setting we will argue that the combined observation of time and low variables is more powerful than the observation of time and low variables separately. The following example aims to illustrate this aspect which comes from the properties of joint probability distributions. 
We assume that the attacker can observe the execution times and that he/she is also able to (partially) distinguish (the final) states. In our example we assume that the states depicted as • and • form two classes which the attacker can identify (e.g. because • and • states have the same values for low, variables). The question now is whether this information allows the attacker to distinguish the two tPTS's.
If we consider the information obtained by observing the running time, we see that both systems exhibit the same time behaviour corresponding to the distribution { 1, However, considering that the attacker can observe running time and labels simultaneously, we see that the system on the right hand side always runs for 2 time steps iff it ends up in a • state and 1 time step iff it ends up in a • state. In the system on the left hand side there is no such correlation between running time and final state. The difference between the two systems, which allows an attacker to distinguish them, is reflected in the joint distributions over T × L. These can be expressed in matrix form for the two systems above as:
Note that while χ 1 is the product of two independent probability distributions on T and L it is not possible to represent χ 2 in the same way.
An Imperative Language
We consider a language similar to that used in [3] with the addition of a probabilistic choice construct. The syntax of the language is as follows:
Operators:
Expressions:
The probabilistic choice is used in an essential way in the program transformation presented later. We also keep the language of types in [3] , although in a simplified form: 
We will indicate by E the state of a computation and denote by E L its restriction to low variables, i.e. a state which is defined as E for all the low variables for which E is defined, and is undefined otherwise. We say that two configurations E | C and
In the following we will sometimes use for configurations the shorthand notation c, c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c ′ , c ′ 1 , . . .. We will also denote by Conf the set of all configurations.
SOS Semantics
The operational semantics of pWhile -except for the probabilistic choice construct -follows essentially the one presented in [3] . For the convenience of the reader we present here all the rules which are based on the big step semantics for expressions (where [[op] ] represents the usual semantics of operators):
The small step semantics is then define as a timed PTS via the SOS rules in Table 1 . The time labels t . represent the time it takes to perform certain operations: t x is the time to store a variable, t e is the time it takes to evaluate an expression, t asn represents the time to perform an assignment, t br is the time required for a branching step, and t ch is the time to perform a probabilistic choice. By ts we denote any sequence of time labels and with √ we indicate termination. The rule (Choose) is the only new rule with respect to the original semantics in [3] . It states that the execution of a probabilistic choice construct leads, after a time t ch , to a state where either the command C or the command D is executed with probability p or 1 − p, respectively. This rule together with the standard transition rules for the other constructs of the language define a tPTS for our pWhile language according to Definition 1. In this tPTS, the state labels are given by the environment, i.e. λ( E | C ) = E.
Abstract Semantics
According to the notion of security we consider in this paper, an observer or attacker can only observe the changes in low variables. Therefore, we can simplify the semantics by 'collapsing' the execution tree in such a way that execution steps during which the value of all low variables is unchanged are combined into one single step. We call an execution sequence σ deterministic if π(σ) = 1, and we call it low stable if λ(s i )| L = l for all s i ∈ σ. The empty path (of length zero) is by definition deterministic and low stable. An execution sequence is maximal deterministic/low stable if it is not a proper sub-sequence of another deterministic/low stable path.
Definition 3. We define the collapsed transition relation by:
This is illustrated in the following example. In the depicted execution trees we indicate in the nodes only the state and omit the program parts of the corresponding configurations. Moreover, we use the notation [n, m] for the state E where h has value n and l has value m. 
The collapsed execution tree on the right hand side represents in effect what an attacker can actually observe during the program execution (for our analysis of the situation we still record the value of h although it is invisible to the attacker).
Bisimulation and Timing Leaks
Observing the low variables and the running time separately is not the same as observing them together; a correlation between the two random variables (probability and time) has to be taken into account (cf. Section 2). A naive probabilistic extension of the Γ -bisimulation notion introduced in [3] might not take this into account. More precisely, this may happen if time and probability are treated as two independent aspects which are observed separately in a mutual exclusive way. According to such a notion an attacker must set up two different covert channels if she wants to exploit possible interference through both the probabilistic and the timing behaviour of the system. The notion of bisimulation we introduce here allows us to define a stronger security condition: an attacker must be able to distinguish the probabilities that two programs compute a given result in a given execution time. This is obviously different from being able to distinguish the probability distributions of the results and the running time.
Probabilistic Time Bisimulation
Probabilistic bisimulation was first introduced in [8] and refers to an equivalence on probability distributions over the states of the processes. This latter equivalence is defined as a lifting of the bisimulation relation on the support sets of the distributions, namely the states themselves.
An equivalence relation ∼ ⊆ S × S on S can be lifted to a relation ∼ * ⊆ Dist(S) × Dist(S) between probability distributions on S via (cf [6, Thm 1]):
It follows that ∼ * is also an equivalence relation ([6, Thm 3]).
For any equivalence relation ∼ on the set Conf of configurations, we define the associated low equivalence relation This definition generalises the one in [3] which only applies to deterministic transition systems. Note that there is a difference between ∼ * L = (∼ L ) * and (∼ * ) L ; in fact, only the former is able to take into account the correlation between time and low variables, while the latter would be a straightforward generalisation of the time bisimulation in [3] which is unable to model such a correlation.
We now exploit the notion of bisimilarity introduced above in order to introduce a security property ensuring that a system is confined against any combined attacks based on both timing and probabilistic covert channels.
Definition 5. A pWhile program P is probabilistic time secure or PT-secure if for any set of initial states E and E
′ such that E L = E ′ L , we have E, P ∼ E ′ , P .
Computing Approximate Bisimulation
The papers [9, 10] introduce an approximate version of bisimulation and confinement where the approximation can be used as a measure ε for the information leakage of the system under analysis. The quantity ε is formally defined in terms of the norm of a linear operator representing the partition induced by the 'minimal' bisimulation on the set of the states of a given system, i.e. the one minimising the observational difference between the system's components. We show here how to compute a non-trivial upper bound δ to ε by essentially exploiting the algorithmic solution proposed by Paige and Tarjan [11] for computing bisimulation equivalence. This was already adapted to PTS's in [12] , where it was used for constructing a padding algorithm as part of a transformational approach to the timing leaks problem. In this approach the computational paths of a program are transformed so as to make it perfectly secure by eliminating any possible timing covert channel while preserving its I/O behaviour. The algorithm we present here is an instantiation of that algorithm where the abstract labels are replaced by the statements in a concrete language (pWhile) and their execution times. Moreover, instead of transforming the execution trees, our algorithm accumulates the information about the difference between their transition probabilities and uses this information to compute an upper bound δ to the maximal information leakage of the given program.
Computing δ for PT-Bisimulation
Algorithm 2 describes a procedure that can be used inside an algorithm for constructing a lumping (i.e. a PT-bisimulation equivalence) of two tPTS's T 1 and T 2 . In particular, Algorithm 1 refers to a such a procedure which follows the algorithmic paradigm for partition refinement introduced by Paige and Tarjan in [11] (see also [13, 14] ). The Paige-Tarjan algorithm constructs a partition of a state space Σ which is stable for a given transition relation →. It is a well-known result that this partition corresponds to a bisimulation equivalence on the transition system (Σ, →). The refinement procedure used in the algorithm consists in splitting the blocks in a given partition P by replacing each block B ∈ P with B ∩ preS and B \ preS, where S ⊆ Σ and pre(X) = {s ∈ Σ | s → x for some x ∈ X}. Assume: T1 execution tree with states S1, and T2 execution tree with states S2 3:
δ ← 0 4: n ← 0 5:
while n ≤ Height(T1 ⊕ T2) do 7:
S ← {B ∩ CutOff(T1 ⊕ T2, n)) | B ∈ P } ⊲ Splitters (below) 8:
while S = ∅ do 9:
choose B ∈ S, S ← S \ B ⊲ Choose a splitter 10:
P ← Splitting(B, P ) ⊲ Split partition 11:
end while 12:
CompDelta(L1, L2) 14:
n ← n + 1 ⊲ Go to next level 15:
end while 16: return δ 17: end procedure Algorithm 2 Algorithm for computing δ 1: procedure CompDelta(L1, L2) 2:
end while 10:
δ ← max(δ, β) 11:
end while 12: end procedure In order to check whether two execution trees T 1 and T 2 in our tPTS model are PT-bisimilar, in Algorithm 1 we apply this refinement technique to the set of states formed by the disjoint union of the states in T 1 and T 2 . The strategy of our lumping procedure QLumping(T 1 , T 2 ) is as follows: it proceeds iteratively layer by layer starting from the leaves layer, and splits the blocks in the current partition restricted to the current layer. The procedure CompDelta(L 1 , L 2 ) computes for each two layers L 1 and L 2 , the maximal difference χ(s 1 ) − χ(s 2 ) ∞ between the probabilities to get from states in T 1 ∩ L 1 and T 2 ∩ L 1 , respectively, into states of layer L 2 . In the original lumping procedure this would determine a splitting of the states in layer L 1 . This value is stored in a variable β and compared with the current value of a variable δ which contains the maximal difference up to that iteration. When the lumping algorithm terminates (that is when we have reached the root of the union tree), one of the following situations will occur: either the roots of T 1 and T 2 belong to the same class in the constructed partition (i.e. T 1 and T 2 are PT-bisimilar) or not. In the latter case δ will contain a maximal difference in the transition probabilities of the two processes which makes them non-bisimilar. This is therefore an estimate of the information leakage of the system. Note that, by construction, δ will be zero in the first case.
The strategy for constructing the lumping described above determines the coarsest partition of a set which is stable wrt a given relation [13, 14] , that is in our case the coarsest PT-bisimulation equivalence. Obviously, this does not necessarily coincide with the 'minimal' one corresponding to the quantity ε defined in [9] . Thus, δ will be in general only a safe approximation, namely an upper bound to the capacity of probabilistic timing covert channel defined by ε. The following proposition is therefore a corollary of Proposition 45 in [9] stating a similar assertion for ε-bisimulation. Proposition 1. P is PT-secure iff for any pair of initial configurations c 1 , c 2 the corresponding execution trees T 1 and T 2 are such that QLumping(T 1 , T 2 ) returns δ = 0.
A Weighted Version: δ

′
The actual value of δ is determined by the way we compute the best match between the joint probability distributions χ(s 1 ) and χ(s 2 ) in line 8 of CompDelta(L 1 , L 2 ). In order to compute δ we use the supremum norm, · ∞ , between two distributions, i.e. the largest absolute difference between corresponding entries in χ(s 1 ) and χ(s 2 ), respectively. In other words, we try to identify a class of states C (in the layer below) and a time interval t such that the probability of reaching this class in that time from s 1 differs maximally from the one for s 2 .
One can argue that this is a fair approach as we treat all classes and time labels the same way. However, it might be useful to develop a measure which reflects the fact that certain times and classes are more similar than others.
From the point of view of the attacker, such a measure would encode her/his ability in detecting similarity as given by the nature and the precision of the instruments he is actually using. For example, suppose it is possible to reach the same class C from s 1 and s 2 with different times t 1 and t 2 , such that the corresponding probabilities determine δ (i.e. we have the maximal difference in this case). However, we might in certain circumstances also want to express the fact that t 1 and t 2 are more or less similar, e.g. for t 1 = 10 and t 2 = 10.5 we might want a smaller δ ′ than for t 1 = 1 and t 2 = 100. In terms of the attacker, this means that we make our estimate dependent on the actual power of the time detection instrument that he/she possesses.
In order to incorporate similarity of times and/or classes we need to modify the way we determine the best match in line 8 of CompDelta(L 1 , L 2 ). Instead of determining the norm between χ(s 1 ) and χ(s 2 ) we can compute a weighted version as:
where ω re-scales the entries in χ(s 1 ) and χ(s 2 ) so as to reflect the relative importance of certain times and/or classes. Note that "·" denotes here the component-wise and not the matrix multiplication: (ω · χ) tC = ω tC χ tC . If, for example, an attacker is not able to detect the absolute difference between times but can only measure multiplicities expressing approximative proportions, we could re-scale the χ's via ω tC = log(t).
In the following we will use a weighted version δ ′ which reflects the similarity of classes. The idea is to weight according to the "replaceability" of a class. To this purpose we associate to every class (in the layers below) a matching measure µ(C) = min C =C ′ δ ′ (C, C ′ ), i.e. we determine the δ ′ between a (sub)tree with a root in the class C in question and all (sub)trees with roots in any of the other classes C ′ . We can take any representative of the classes C and C ′ as these are by definition bisimilar. The measure µ indicates how easy it is to replace class C by another one, or how good/precise is the attacker in distinguishing successor states. Then δ ′ is simply the weighted version of δ as described above with ω tC = µ(C). Note that there is no problem with the fact that δ ′ is defined recursively as we always know the δ ′ in the layers below before we compute δ ′ in the current layer.
Example 2. In order to illustrate how δ and δ ′ quantify the difference between various execution trees, let us consider the following four trees.
We abstract from the influence of different transition times and individual state labels, i.e. we assume that t = 1 for all transitions and that all states are labelled with the same label. If we compute the δ and δ ′ values between all the pairs of systems we get the following results:
.000 0.500 1.000 0.000 T 2 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.500 T 3 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 T 4 0.000 0.500 1.000 0.000 From this we see that δ and δ ′ are symmetric, i.e. the difference between two systems is symmetric; that every system is bisimilar with itself, i.e. δ = 0 = δ ′ (as we have an empty diagonal); and that the difference between two systems is between zero and one with values in between very well possible.
Cost Analysis
In a recent article on "Software Bugtraps" in The Economist the authors report on some ongoing research at NIST on "Software Assurance Metrics and Tool Evaluation" [15] . They claim that "The purpose of the research is to get away from the feeling that 'all software has bugs' and say 'it will cost this much money to make software of this kind of quality'". They then conclude: "Rather than trying to stamp out bugs altogether, in short, the future of "software that makes software better" may lie in working out where the pesticide can be most cost-effectively applied".
Our aim is to introduce "cost factors" in a similar way into computer security. Instead of trying to achieve perfect security we will look at the trade-off between costs of security counter measures -such as increased average running time -and the improvement in terms of security, which we can measure via the δ introduced above. Even in simple examples we are able to exhibit interesting effects.
Security Typing
In [3] Agat introduces a program transformation to remove covert timing channels (timing leaks) from programs written in a sequential imperative programming language. The language used is a language of security types with two security levels that is based on earlier work by Volpano and Smith [16, 1] . Whilst Volpano and Smith restrict the condition in both while-loops and ifcommands to being of the lowest security level, Agat allows the condition in an if-command to be high security providing that an external observer cannot detect which branch was taken. He shows that if a program is typeable in his system, then it is secure against timing attacks. This result depends critically on a notion of bisimulation; an if-command with a high security condition is only typeable if the two branches are bisimilar. Agat's notion of bisimilarity is timing aware and based on a notion of low-equivalence which ensures stepwise non-interference. He does not give an algorithm for bisimulation checking.
If a program fails to type, Agat presents a transformation system to remove the timing leak. The transformation pads the branches of if-commands with high security conditions with dummy commands. The objective of the padding is that both branches end up with the same timing and thus become indistinguishable by an external observer. The transformation utilises the concept of a low-slice: for a given command C, its low-slice C L has the same syntactic structure as C but only has assignments to low security variables; all assignments to high security variables and branching on high security conditions are replaced by skip commands of appropriate duration. The transformation involves extending the branches in a high security if-command by adding the low-slice from the other branch. The effect of this transformation is that the timing of the execution of both branches are the same and equal to the sum of timing of the two branches in the untransformed program. Agat demonstrates that the transformation is semantically sound and that transformed programs are secure (correctness). In order to extend this system to our language, we only have to add a rule for the choose statement (essentially a straight forward extension of the rule for if). In detail, we present the typing rules in Table 2 . Note that the rule (If H ) refers to the semantic notion of timed bisimilarity (as introduced in Section 4.1).
Probabilistic Transformation
We consider a probabilistic variant of Agat's language. Probabilities play an important role in the transformation. Rather than just adding the low slice from the other branch to each branch of a high security conditional, we transform each branch to make a probabilistic choice between its padded and untransformed variant. This allows us to trade-off the increased run-time of the padded program versus the vulnerability to attack of the untransformed program. The transformation described is just one on a whole spectrum of probabilistic transformations -at the other extreme we could probabilistically decide whether or not to execute each command in the low slice. All the formal transformation rules for probabilistic padding are the same as in [3] . The only exception is the rule (If H ): Here we replace -provided certain typing conditions are fulfilled -the branches of an if statement not just by the correctly "padded" version as in [3] ; instead we introduce in every branch a choice such that the secure replacement will be executed only with probability p while with probability 1 − p the original code fragment will be executed.
In order to transform programs into secure versions we need to introduce an auxiliary notion, namely the notion of global effect ge(C) of commands. This is used to identify (global) variables Table 4 . Versions of Agat's Program: agat,pagat, and fagat slightly: The insecure program agat we start with is depicted on the left side in Table 4 . The fully padded version Agat's algorithm produces, fagat, is on the right hand side of Table 4 (to keep things simple we omit Agat's empty statements like skipAsn s s; as skip as well as s:=s can be used just to 'spend time' without having any real effect on the store we can use e.g. s:=s in place of Agat's skipAsn s s). The program, pagat, presented in the middle of Table 4 is the result of probabilistic padding: The original program agat is transformed in such a way that the compensating statements, i.e. low slices, are executed only with probability p while with probability q = 1 − p the original code is executed. For p = 0 we have the same behaviour as the original program agat while for p = 1 this program behaves in the same way as Agat's fully padded version fagat.
In our concrete experiments we used the following assumptions. The variable i can take values in {1, .., 4} while k is a three dimensional array with values in {0, 1} -nothing is concretely assumed about s. The variables k, representing a secret key, and s have security typing H, while i is the only low variable which can be observed by an attacker. We implemented this example using (arbitrary) execution times: t asn = 3 (assign time), t br = 2 (test/branch time), and t skip = 1 (skip time), and t ch = 0 (choice time).
The abstract semantics for the pagat program -which only records choice points and the moments in time when the low variable changes its value -produces the following execution trees if we start with keys k=011 and k=010: in practical terms that the attacker has to spend more and more time (i.e. repeated observations of the program) in order to determine with high confidence the exact execution time and thus deduce the value of k[i] (cf. e.g. [9] ). The price we have to pay for increased security, i.e. indistinguishability of behaviours, is an increased (average) execution time. The graph on the left in Figure 1 shows how the running time (vertical axis) increases in dependence of the padding probability p (horizontal axis) for the eight execution trees we have to consider in this example, i.e. for k = 000, k = 001, k = 010, etc. Depending on the number of bits set in k we get four different curves which show how, for example for k = 000 the running time increases from 29 time steps (for p = 0, i.e. agat program) to 38 (for p = 1, i.e. fagat program).
We can employ the bisimilarity measures δ and δ ′ in order to determine the security of the partially padded program. For this we compute using our algorithm δ(k i , k j ) and δ ′ (k i , k j ) for all possible keys, i.e. i, j = 0, . . . 7. It turns out that δ = 1 for all values of p < 1 and any pair of keys k i and k j with i = i; only for p = 1 we get, as one would expect, δ = 0 for all key pairs. The weighted measure δ ′ is more sensitive and we get for example for p = 0.5 the following values when we compare k i and k j : The diagonal entries are, of course, all zero as every execution tree is bisimilar to itself. The other entries however are different from 0 and 1 and reflect the similarity between the two keys and thus the resulting execution trees. If we plot the development of δ ′ as a function of p we observe only three patterns as depicted in the right graph in Figure 1 . In all three cases δ ′ decreases from an original value 1 to 0, but in different ways.
In analysing the trade-off between increased running time and security we need to define a cost function. For example, one could be faced with a situation where a certain code fragment needs to be executed in a certain maximal time, i.e. there is a (cost) penalty if the execution takes longer than a certain number of micro-seconds. In our case we will consider a very simple cost function c(p) = 6δ
′ (p) + t(p) with δ ′ (p) and t(p) the average δ ′ between all possible execution trees and t One can argue about the practical relevance of the particular cost function we chose. Nevertheless, this example illustrates already nicely the non-linear nature of security cost optimisation: The optimal, i.e. minimal, cost is reached in this case for p = 0.5, i.e. keeping the cost of security counter measures in mind it is better to use a "half-fixed" program rather than a completely safe one.
Related and Further Work
The idea of defining a secure system via the requirement that an attacker must be unable to observe different behaviours as a result of different secrets -i.e. the system "operates in the same way" whatever value a secret key has -goes back at least to the seminal work of Goguen and Meseguer [17] .
This led in a number of settings to formalisations of security concepts such as "non-interference" via various notions of behavioural equivalencies (see e.g. [18, 19] ). One of the perhaps most prominent of these equivalence notions, namely bisimilarity, plays an important role in the context of security of concurrent systems but also found application for sequential programs such as in Agat's work (as the interaction between system and attacker can be modelled as a parallel composition). In order to allow for a decision theoretic analysis of security counter-measures and associated efforts it appears to be desirable to introduce a "quantitative" notion of the underlying behavioural equivalence. In the case of bisimilarity a first step was the introduction of the notion of probabilistic bisimulation by Larson and Skou [8] . However, this notion turns out to be still too strict and a number of researchers developed "approximate" versions; among them we just name the approaches by Desharnais et.al. [20, 21] and van Breugel [22] and our work [10, 24] (an extensive bibliography on this issue can be found in [23] ). We based this current paper on the latter approach because it allows for an implementation of the semantics of pWhile via linear operators, i.e. matrices, and an efficient computation of δ and δ ′ using standard software such as octave [25] . Further research will be needed in order to clarify the relation between our measures δ and existing notions of approximate bisimilarity mentioned above, e.g. the ε in [9] . Furthermore, we also would like to shed more light on the relationship between our notion and information theoretic concepts used in the work of, for example Clark et.al. [26] and Boreale [27] .
